The Western Balkans are a region of great concern for the US and EU, as it is home to Russia and China. Policymakers in Washington and Brussels view the integration of southern/central European states into the EU and NATO as necessary for stabilising the region and countering Moscow and Beijing’s influence. Western concerns about Moscow’s actions in the region increased after Russia’s full-scale military offensive against Ukraine last year. Russia takes advantage of ethnic tensions, religious divides, and historical grievances in former Yugoslav republics to undermine the West’s interests in stabilising the region and integrating these countries into the EU and NATO.
Local players aligned with Moscow’s interests are key to Russia’s ability to assert influence in the region. Serbia, the Western Balkan country closest to Russia, was the only European country not to impose sanctions on Russia in February 2022. Ethnic Serb and pro-Russian actors in neighbouring countries help Moscow assert its clout in southern/central Europe. Since February 2022, the US has been increasingly concerned about these Serb groups taking actions that could advance the Kremlin’s anti-EU and anti-NATO agendas.
Serbia is often called a Russian „proxy state” due to its bilateral ties with Russia. After February 2022, Serbia did not join Europe’s anti-Russia consensus and refused to implement Western sanctions on Moscow. Serbia’s mostly-state-owned Air Serbia doubled the number of Belgrade-Moscow flights to 15 a week after Russia’s full-scale military offensive against Ukraine.
Religion also bonds many Serbians to Russia by virtue of shared Orthodox identities. Putin uses the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) to strengthen Russian influence in the Western Balkans, with the SOC often serving to provide religious legitimacy to various aspects of Moscow’s foreign policy actions. However, none of this proves that Serbia is Russia’s „proxy state.”
Belgrade-Moscow relations are fundamentally about pragmatism, not religion or emotion. As the world becomes more multipolar, Serbia doesn’t want to put all its eggs into either a Western or Eastern basket. Serbia conducts a balanced foreign policy, not aligning with one geopolitical bloc or another. As an EU candidate, Serbia can’t officially be a part of the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM), but its observer status in NAM reflects the international organisation’s thinking.
Russia values having a country in central Europe that is as friendly to Moscow as Serbia. Belgrade knows that the West can easily exert pressure on Serbia, and if they push the envelope too far in challenging the West, there could be huge prices for Serbians to pay.