Zapad-2025 is a Russian-Belarusian strategic exercise whose “hot phase” is to take place from Friday, 12 September to Monday, 16 September, mainly on the territory of Belarus. The official narrative speaks of defending against “aggression from the West,” practicing the repulse of air strikes and sabotage, and demonstrating close cooperation between Minsk and Moscow in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Western analyses emphasize that Zapad is also a politico-military signal sent to NATO, especially after a series of incidents involving Russian drones entering Polish airspace.
The principal exercise areas are located in the Belarusian interior, including the Barysaw (Barysau) region, but episodes are also to take place closer to the Lithuanian border—around Gozha near Grodno—as well as on Russian ranges in the Kaliningrad Oblast (e.g., near Pravdinsk). This disposition enables parallel training of ground forces, air power, air defense and missile troops in a “forward-area” theater, while keeping the core of the drills outside the immediate border belt, which Minsk presents as a “de-escalatory” gesture.

The scale of Zapad-2025 is controversial. The Belarusian side traditionally cites a limited troop count (about 13,000), whereas NATO and regional estimates point to as many as 30,000 participants—with some activities (logistics, dispersed elements) often reported outside official tables. Such discrepancies are a constant feature of earlier Zapad editions, where the actual scope exceeded declared figures.

A strand that draws particular attention is the nuclear and missile component. Zapad-2025—in planning and simulation terms—includes scenarios for the use of tactical nuclear weapons and delivery systems that Russia deployed in Belarus under 2024 agreements. This kind of signaling, combining displays of system mobility and “nuclear messaging,” has a deterrent dimension vis-à-vis NATO and politically deepens Minsk’s dependence on Moscow.

Zapad-2025 does not occur in a vacuum—it is the culmination of a cycle that Russia and Belarus have conducted (with pauses and shifts in scale) for years, alternating with the Vostok, Tsentr and Kavkaz maneuvers. Since 2021, each subsequent Zapad has been interpreted by neighbors as a test of offensive capabilities on the “Baltic–Suwałki” axis and as a tool for masking real preparations for warfare (echoing the experience of “Union Resolve 2022” that preceded the invasion of Ukraine). Analyses by the CEPA think tank note that this year’s edition also serves to check how heavily the prolonged war has burdened Russia’s logistics and reserves.
In response, NATO states on the eastern flank have adopted visible precautions. Poland has announced the deployment of around 40,000 troops near its borders in the coming days, raising air-defense and counter-drone readiness and strengthening support for border services. The decision was justified by the offensive character of Zapad and by recent violations of Polish airspace by Russian drones during strikes on Ukraine. In parallel, Poland has introduced temporary air-traffic restrictions (zone EP R129) along the borders with Belarus and Ukraine—from 10 September to 9 December—with a ban on civilian drone flights.

Protective steps have also been taken by the Baltic states. Latvia—after the series of incidents with drones over Poland—announced the closure of its airspace in a belt along the eastern border from 11 to at least 18 September, with the possibility of extension; Vilnius has intensified exercises and border surveillance, pointing to the risk of provocations during Zapad. These measures are intended to limit the possibility of UAV incursions and to facilitate the identification and neutralization of unauthorized objects.
At the diplomatic and allied level, Zapad-2025 fits into a period of heightened tension. After the mass drone violation of Polish skies (the night of 9/10 September), Warsaw triggered consultations under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty and is seeking additional air-defense components. The situation is also being discussed by the UN Security Council at Poland’s request. Such a backdrop increases the region’s sensitivity to any incident during the drills.
What exactly will be trained? Beyond classic elements (force movement, transition from peace to war, fires, reconnaissance, electronic warfare), two vectors are crucial. First, the integration of air and counter-drone defense with the saturating use of air-attack means—the lessons from the Ukrainian front are filtering into the scenarios. Second, a test of logistics resilience: sustaining the tempo of operations under conditions of network disruption and precision strikes by the adversary. Both aspects are highlighted in expert reports and commentaries.
Escalation risks include accidental or deliberate border violations (especially in the Suwałki corridor), false-flag operations, aggressive maneuvers in the airspace and in the Baltic Sea, and hybrid pressure (cyber, disinformation, instrumentalized migration). British and Lithuanian media and analysts warn that Russia may use Zapad to create a “fog of war” conducive to probing NATO reactions at a low escalation threshold.

For civilians, the most noticeable effects are air-traffic restrictions and temporary communication disruptions. Poland has temporarily limited flights in the east of the country and—incidentally—closed airports during the drone crisis; Latvia is closing a strip of airspace along its borders. Airlines and civilian drone operators should monitor PANSA/NOTAM notices and their Baltic counterparts.

How to assess the significance of Zapad-2025? In the military dimension, it is a test of the Russian-Belarusian grouping’s ability to conduct joint operations under the pressure of a real conflict. In the political dimension, it is a demonstration that Moscow and Minsk retain the initiative in escalation and can set the pace of events on NATO’s eastern flank. In the strategic dimension, it is another stage in a long “stress test” of allied resilience, already prompting states in the region to increase military presence, tighten airspace rules, and coordinate closely within NATO and the EU.

Finally—the timeline and what to watch: 12–16 September (main phase); potential episodes in the Kaliningrad Oblast and northwestern Belarus; the dynamics of air and missile activity (including staff-level exercises with nuclear delivery systems); logistics movements around Suwałki; NATO reactions and counter-drills in the Baltic states and Poland. Assessing the significance of Zapad-2025 will be aided by comparing the scale of actual activity with official declarations and observing whether there is a full withdrawal of forces and assets after the drills conclude.