A shipment of Turkish-made military drones to Kosovo has reignited long-standing tensions between Ankara and Belgrade, exposing the fragile balance that defines the relationship between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić.

After initially accusing Turkey of harboring “imperial ambitions,” Vučić quickly softened his tone, praising Erdoğan as a “great leader” and reaffirming Serbia’s desire for “the closest possible relations” with Turkey. The reversal highlights the pragmatic — and often transactional — nature of their cooperation.

A Decade of Pragmatism

For more than a decade, Ankara and Belgrade have maintained what might best be described as a relationship of convenience — driven by booming trade, growing defense ties, and Belgrade’s willingness to accommodate Turkey’s political sensitivities abroad.

However, Kosovo remains Vučić’s political red line. Facing unprecedented domestic protests, he has turned once again to the Kosovo issue to rally nationalist support. His outburst over this week’s drone shipment to Pristina was more about domestic optics than diplomacy.

From Ottoman Shadows to Economic Diplomacy

Tensions between the two countries are not new. In 2013, Erdoğan’s remark in Prizren that “Kosovo is Turkey, and Turkey is Kosovo” provoked outrage in Serbia. But following 2014, the Turkish leader’s personal diplomacy — and Serbia’s interest in foreign investment — helped repair the rift.

Turkey’s economic footprint in Serbia remains modest, ranking around 15th among foreign investors in the 2010s. Yet its visibility far exceeds its size. Turkish companies have opened factories in underdeveloped Serbian regions, often with Vučić personally attending ribbon-cutting ceremonies and hailing Turkey as the only country investing in smaller towns.

Politics After the 2016 Coup Attempt

Relations deepened after Turkey’s failed coup attempt in 2016. Serbia was among the first countries to condemn the plotters and the only Western Balkan state to close institutions linked to cleric Fethullah Gülen, whom Ankara blames for orchestrating the coup.

The show of solidarity was rewarded. When Kosovo applied for Interpol membership later that year, Turkey — initially a vocal supporter — toned down its backing after Serbian lobbying. The subtle shift in rhetoric earned Belgrade’s goodwill without forcing Ankara to change its formal stance.

Defence Cooperation and Diverging Interests

By 2019, the two countries had signed a defense cooperation agreement, and Vučić even expressed interest in acquiring Bayraktar TB2 drones — the same model now stirring controversy. Serbia eventually dropped the plan after Kosovo obtained the same technology in 2023.

Vučić’s current outrage over Kosovo’s drone delivery, accusing Turkey of “dreaming of restoring the Ottoman Empire,” was short-lived. His quick retraction underscored that despite nationalist rhetoric, Serbia values its partnership with Ankara — not least for its political utility and economic benefits.

Ankara’s Waning Influence in Kosovo

Meanwhile, Turkey’s relations with Kosovo have cooled. Though Ankara was among the first to recognize Kosovo’s independence in 2008 and has invested heavily in its infrastructure — from airports and energy to banking — its political leverage has declined.

Turkey’s influence peaked during the Hashim Thaçi era, when personalized diplomacy flourished. But the 2018 deportation of six Turkish citizens accused of ties to the Gülen movement — a covert joint operation between Ankara and Pristina — sparked backlash and highlighted the limits of Turkish influence once Kosovo’s political scene became more fragmented.

Since Thaçi’s resignation and the rise of the Vetevendosje movement under Prime Minister Albin Kurti, Ankara’s approach has become less personal and more institutional, focusing on NATO cooperation and defense partnerships.

In 2024, Turkey and Kosovo signed a military cooperation agreement — deemed illegal by Belgrade under UN Security Council Resolution 1244 — paving the way for the sale of drones, armored vehicles, and the establishment of an ammunition factory.

A Calculated Balancing Act

Despite periodic flare-ups, Ankara and Belgrade continue to rely on one another. For Erdoğan, Serbia remains the most stable and strategically valuable partner in the Western Balkans. For Vučić, Turkey offers an economic and political ally outside the EU framework — useful leverage amid tense relations with Brussels.

Vučić’s latest rhetorical outburst should thus be seen for what it is: a domestic performance aimed at deflecting attention from growing street protests and opposition unrest. His rapid backtracking confirms that neither side is willing to jeopardize a partnership that serves both leaders’ immediate interests.

In the end, the uneasy alliance between Serbia and Turkey will likely endure — a friendship built on convenience rather than trust, shaped less by shared values than by shared pragmatism.