Poland’s president, Karol Nawrocki, has decided to significantly shorten his visit to Hungary after Prime Minister Viktor Orbán travelled to Moscow to meet Vladimir Putin. What was originally planned as a two-day visit, including talks in both Esztergom and Budapest, has been reduced to Nawrocki’s participation only in the Visegrád Group presidential summit in Esztergom. There will be no bilateral programme in the Hungarian capital and no one-on-one meeting with Orbán.
The announcement came from Marcin Przydacz, head of the International Policy Bureau, who made it clear that this was a political response to Orbán’s trip to Russia and to the message that visit sends in the middle of the war in Ukraine. By framing the decision explicitly as a reaction to the Moscow meeting, Warsaw is signaling that relations with Budapest cannot continue as usual while Hungary’s prime minister presents himself alongside Putin as a partner in supposed “peace” efforts that in practice undermine the joint line of the EU and NATO.
In his statement, Przydacz underlined two points that matter for understanding Nawrocki’s move. First, he stressed that the Polish president consistently supports searching for real ways to end the war in Ukraine that was launched by the Russian Federation. Second, he pointed out that Nawrocki consciously refers to the legacy of late president Lech Kaczyński, who built regional security policy around solidarity among Central and Eastern European states and a firm stance towards Moscow. The reference to Kaczyński is not accidental. It evokes his famous warning that Russia’s aggression, if left unchecked, would move from one neighbour to the next, and it situates Nawrocki in that tradition of strategic thinking rather than in a more transactional, “bridge-building” posture represented today by Orbán.
The political meaning of this step operates on several levels. On the bilateral level, Poland is sending a clear message to Hungary that public rapprochement with the Kremlin comes at a diplomatic cost. By cancelling the Budapest leg of the visit, Nawrocki avoids images and narratives that could be used to suggest that Poland tacitly accepts Orbán’s line on Russia. It is a form of polite but unmistakable distancing, carried out not through loud condemnation, but through the quiet removal of high-profile ceremonial and political gestures.
On the regional level, the decision inevitably affects the already fragile cohesion of the Visegrád Group. For years, Budapest has drifted away from the mainstream of Central European security thinking, especially after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Hungary has opposed or delayed EU sanctions packages, blocked or limited military support to Kyiv, and maintained privileged energy and political ties with Moscow. Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, despite their internal differences, have largely moved in the opposite direction, aligning themselves closely with Ukraine and with NATO’s deterrence posture. Nawrocki’s move makes this split visible at the level of presidential diplomacy and shows that the V4 format can no longer mask profound strategic disagreements.
At the same time, the gesture strengthens Poland’s image among Kyiv and Western partners. Ukrainian officials have already reacted positively, interpreting the shortened visit as proof that Warsaw remains principled on the Russian issue and attentive to Ukrainian sensitivities. In a context where some European capitals flirt with the language of “fatigue” and “normalisation” in relations with Russia, any visible refusal to legitimise photo-op peace theatrics with Putin carries symbolic weight. For the United States and key EU states, the decision helps to confirm that the new Polish presidency will not weaken the country’s established pro-Ukrainian, pro-NATO line.
Domestically, the episode also reveals something about Nawrocki’s own political positioning. Although he comes from a conservative, patriotic milieu and was widely seen as close to the previous governing camp, he is signalling that he intends to exercise a degree of autonomy in foreign policy. Cutting back the Hungary visit is not a cost-free move. It exposes him to criticism from pro-Orbán or more Russia-tolerant circles, and it complicates the narrative of an unproblematic “conservative axis” stretching from Warsaw to Budapest. Yet Nawrocki appears willing to accept this in order to anchor himself firmly in a tradition of Atlanticism and regional solidarity that transcends current party lines in Poland.
The communication style chosen by the presidential chancellery is telling. There has been no theatrical rupture, no call for sanctions on Hungary, no suggestion that the Visegrád format should be dismantled. Instead, there is a calm, almost understated rearrangement of the schedule combined with a clear explanation of its reasons. That combination of restraint in form and firmness in substance may become a hallmark of Nawrocki’s international activity. It allows him to defend strategic principles without sliding into permanent confrontation with partners whose policies he considers harmful.
In the longer term, this episode will likely accelerate a process that has been underway for some time: the gradual redefinition of Central Europe’s internal alignments. Poland may seek even closer coordination with the Baltic states, Romania and the Nordic countries, where views on Russia and on support for Ukraine are much more closely aligned with Warsaw’s priorities. Hungary, meanwhile, risks further isolation within both NATO and the EU if it continues to cultivate its special relationship with Moscow. Nawrocki’s decision to limit his visit is a small but visible reminder that, in a region living under the shadow of war, gestures matter – and that standing next to Putin comes with consequences, even among former close allies.
