The year 2026 could bring an end to Viktor Orbán’s 16-year rule in Hungary. For months, opinion polls have been giving Péter Magyar’s TISZA party a clear lead—though that, of course, does not decide anything yet. But anyone hoping that a change of government in Hungary would produce a pro-Ukrainian turn in Budapest may be in for a rude awakening.

The past year unquestionably belonged to Péter Magyar. He continued building party structures and withstood a frontal assault from pro-government Hungarian media: accusations of cooperation with Ukraine, claims that he was “selling Hungary to Brussels,” the scandal over a data leak from the TISZA app, and an endless stream of anti-Magyar poster campaigns on the streets. He survived it all.

It is worth recalling that the ruling camp directs its messaging primarily at “the already convinced”—its own electorate—as well as at least some of the undecided voters mentioned earlier. One must remember that there is virtually no voter flow between Fidesz and TISZA, so the parties do not waste energy trying to persuade committed opponents.

Hungary: An end-of-year poll

Last year, Péter Magyar continued his tour of Hungary, carrying out several actions and holding dozens of meetings with potential voters. On the final day of 2025, the opposition daily Népszava published the results of a poll it commissioned, conducted by the research agency Publicus. Hungarians were asked about the biggest success, the biggest scandal and the biggest failure.

As the most important political event, respondents pointed precisely to Magyar’s tour (32%), which very slightly edged out Viktor Orbán’s meeting with Donald Trump (30%). For Fidesz, that meeting was not only the most important event of the year; it was also meant to demonstrate the great success of Orbán’s policy line. Third place (7%) went to TISZA’s selection of candidates in single-member districts—chosen via internal elections by the party’s supporters.

One major achievement for Magyar is that Fidesz’s anti-TISZA campaign linked to the data leak from the “TISZA World” application proved ineffective. Only 14% of respondents named it as the “biggest scandal.” From Magyar’s perspective, it matters that the largest scandal was identified as the violence case at a juvenile correctional facility in Budapest (39%) and the “evaporation” of public funds from the foundations of the Hungarian National Bank (28%).

This latter issue fits into TISZA’s narrative about “taking back the state” from corrupt politicians and oligarchs.

From Fidesz’s standpoint, the fact that such a high share of voters named the scandal at the correctional facility on Szőlő Street as the biggest controversy is an enormous threat. It strikes at the party’s image as a political force that defends children. It is another crack in that image, following the 2024 revelations that the president had pardoned a person convicted in a case involving the abuse of minors. After that affair, the president resigned, and Magyar entered politics in opposition to Fidesz.

Therefore, one can expect that TISZA’s narrative strategy, three months before the election, will focus on themes of child protection and holding the Fidesz government to account—rather than on detailed, substantive proposals for concrete action, for example in healthcare.

The campaign itself will, in any case, concentrate not on policy substance but almost exclusively on emotions. The 2026 election will be a plebiscite evaluating the Fidesz–KDNP camp.