Hungary is entering a crucial phase of the campaign ahead of the parliamentary election scheduled for 12 April 2026. The latest poll by the Republikon Institute suggests that the opposition TISZA party is still in the lead, but its advantage over Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s governing Fidesz has shrunk compared with late 2025.
According to Republikon, among decided voters TISZA can count on around 47% support, while Fidesz stands at about 38%. That translates into a nine-point lead for the opposition—smaller than in December, when the gap was in double digits. Looking at the electorate as a whole, TISZA also remains ahead (roughly 33% versus 28% for Fidesz). At the same time, the share of undecided voters is still high—Republikon puts it at around 27%—which means the outcome remains open and mobilisation in the final weeks could prove decisive.
It is also worth watching the “second tier” of the party system. In the same poll, two other groups clear the 5% threshold: the far-right Our Homeland Movement (Mi Hazánk) and the satirical Two-Tailed Dog Party (MKKP). The presence of smaller parties in Hungary can matter not only arithmetically but also narratively—shifting debate toward identity and anti-system themes and, late in the campaign, shaping tactical vote transfers.
The modest erosion of TISZA’s lead fits into a sharper, more polarised campaign. International reporting has noted that Viktor Orbán is increasingly building his electoral message around a “war versus peace” axis, linking security and the war in Ukraine with criticism of financial support for Kyiv and with tougher anti-Ukrainian rhetoric. In this framing, the election becomes a referendum not only on who governs, but on Hungary’s geopolitical orientation—and on whether Budapest will continue to defy the EU mainstream. There have also been reports that Orbán plans mobilisation efforts in the form of a “national petition” opposing EU support for Ukraine, a tool aimed especially at voters outside the major cities.
TISZA, led by Péter Magyar—a politician who has moved from being an insider in the system to leading the country’s largest opposition force—has been trying to persuade voters that it can combine political change with “state competence,” particularly on economic issues. In this context, one notable opposition move has been to bring in recognisable names from the business world: reporting has described Magyar assigning a prominent advisory role on economic matters to a former Shell executive, an attempt to strengthen the credibility of TISZA’s economic programme and distinguish it from earlier opposition arrangements.
At the same time, polls themselves should be read with caution: beyond methodological differences, an important factor is the divide between firms perceived as independent and those associated with the governing camp. It has been noted that while many independent polls show TISZA ahead, surveys by institutes seen as closer to the government sometimes point to a more favourable scenario for Fidesz. That means the key question toward the finish is not only “who is leading?” but “who will turn out their voters more effectively—and who will win over the undecided.”
In practice, the coming weeks will test two strategies. For Fidesz: whether a security-and-“peace” narrative combined with pocketbook issues (the cost of living, stability, sectoral taxes) will be enough to reverse the trend among wavering voters. For TISZA: whether it can hold together a broad base of support—often composed of former voters of other opposition parties—while presenting a convincing economic and institutional agenda, without losing the protest energy that propelled Magyar into the top tier. With the margins now tight, even small shifts in sentiment—and turnout itself—could decide the result.
