Ukrainian services—the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and the Main Directorate of Intelligence of Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence (HUR)—reported in late January the detention in Kyiv of a 35-year-old Belarusian national who is alleged to have acted as an agent of Belarus’s KGB. According to official statements and media reports, the woman operated under the cover of journalistic work, and investigators suspect she collected sensitive information for the Belarusian services.

From a procedural standpoint, this is still the pre-trial phase. Many details are circulating publicly, but they largely come from government communications and media reporting—information that may still be verified, уточnioned, or contested as the case develops.

What investigators allege

In an official statement, Ukraine’s Prosecutor General’s Office indicated that the suspect allegedly established contact with representatives of Belarus’s KGB in 2025 and agreed to “confidential cooperation” in exchange for payment. Investigators’ version suggests she gathered and passed on information, including about the activities of selected units of Ukraine’s military intelligence, the operational situation and internal processes, and that she showed interest in individuals linked to operational and agent work.

Some media outlets—citing Ukrainian sources—also claim she had been connected to the services for many years (with 2015 often mentioned) and that she was directed toward operations in Ukraine earlier. These elements, however, appear mainly in press narratives rather than in brief, official formulations released to the public.

Journalistic cover and the Interfax-Ukraine thread

A key part of the story is the alleged “cover” itself. The detainee is said to have functioned as a journalist within Ukraine’s media environment. Ukrainian and Belarusian outlets pointed to her ties to Kyiv-based newsrooms. Detector Media reported that she worked at Interfax-Ukraine between 2021 and 2024, noting that after she left the outlet had no further contact with her.

Some publications also mention an earlier episode involving media associated with Viktor Medvedchuk, presented as background that may have helped her build a network of contacts. This, too, remains a media-reported element and should be treated cautiously unless it becomes part of evidence disclosed in court.

“Honeytrap” and intimate relationships: what is confirmed and what is media reporting

The most attention-grabbing aspect concerns alleged methods. Ukrainian broadcaster TSN aired a segment suggesting the suspect used romantic and sexual relationships as a tool to gain access to information or influence interlocutors. Similar claims were repeated by Belsat while summarizing TSN’s reporting. It is important to underline, however: these are journalistic claims and do not necessarily reflect the precise wording of charges laid out in publicly available procedural documents.

An ex-partner posts photos. His account of events

A separate, emotionally charged thread emerged after—according to Belsat—a Belarusian volunteer, Alaksandr Molchanau, posted shared photos on social media, claiming they had been in a relationship in the past. In an interview cited by the media, he reportedly said he was unaware of any espionage activity, that she did not try to recruit him or extract information from him, although—by his account—she sometimes expressed pro-Russian views.

This episode also illustrates how quickly counterintelligence cases spill into social media and the public sphere—often before the public receives hard, court-tested answers to the question: “what has been proven, and what remains a hypothesis?”

What’s next: detention and the potential sentence

Ukrainian media reported that a court ordered pre-trial detention and that the case is being treated as “espionage,” with a possible maximum sentence of around 15 years’ imprisonment (some reports also mention the possibility of asset confiscation). At this stage, however, these remain allegations and potential legal outcomes—not a final verdict.

The wider context: information warfare and the intelligence contest

The case fits a broader picture of intensified intelligence activity under wartime conditions and heightened counterintelligence pressure. Operating under professional cover, building networks of relationships, and exploiting trust (including intimate relationships) are methods described in intelligence literature and practice for decades—but in any specific case the crucial distinction is between what is “possible” and what is “proven.”