Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the Belarusian opposition leader in exile, is sounding the alarm that Russia is strengthening its military footprint in Belarus and preparing to deploy missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads there—closer to the European Union’s borders. In her account, this is not just a military signal but also a political message, and she urges European capitals to pay far closer attention to what is happening in Minsk and to the role played by Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s regime.
The warning is tied to reports and claims about systems described as “Oreshnik”—weapons portrayed in Russian messaging as nuclear-capable, even if such systems can also be configured for conventional payloads. From a regional security perspective, the issue is not only whether a given launcher is technically “nuclear-capable,” but also where it is positioned and what that does to escalation dynamics. Moving delivery systems—or the infrastructure to host them—closer to the EU can shorten flight times to certain targets and increase political pressure, even if the decision-making authority over any nuclear use remains in Moscow.
Tsikhanouskaya’s argument has been reinforced in public debate by references to satellite imagery and recent reporting that suggest heightened activity in areas mentioned as potential deployment zones. But satellite photos, while useful, rarely provide definitive proof of nuclear warheads being present. They can indicate construction, changes in base layouts, the movement of equipment, or patterns of activity; they do not automatically confirm the storage or transfer of warheads. This distinction matters because delivery platforms can be deployed or showcased while warheads remain stored inside Russia and would only be moved in a crisis—leaving room for deliberate ambiguity.
She also frames the story as part of a wider pattern: Belarus, in her view, is becoming both a forward operating area and an industrial support base for Russia’s war against Ukraine. In interviews, she has pointed to the scale of Belarusian economic involvement—hundreds of firms allegedly supporting Russia’s defense-industrial needs, including production linked to drones and the expansion of manufacturing capacity. The underlying message is that Minsk is not merely “hosting” Russian forces but is being integrated into the machinery that sustains escalation.
At the same time, a cooling voice appears in the public discussion. Former U.S. envoy to Ukraine Kurt Volker has argued that command and control over Russia’s nuclear arsenal remains in Russian hands regardless of whether certain systems sit inside Russia or several hundred kilometers away in Belarus. In other words, geography can change risk perceptions and response times, but it does not necessarily create an entirely new reality of political control—nor does it automatically mean the threat is categorically different from what Europe already faces from Russia’s nuclear posture.
In practical terms, Tsikhanouskaya’s appeal to Europe highlights two overlapping risks. The first is strategic: Belarus as a staging ground and logistical extension for Russian capabilities, which raises pressure on neighboring states and complicates defense planning on NATO’s eastern flank. The second is political and sanctions-related: Belarus as a channel for supporting, servicing, or enabling Russia’s defense industry, potentially undermining the effectiveness of European restrictions. Read this way, her warning is not only about nuclear symbolism, but about treating Belarus as a central element of the security architecture on the EU’s eastern border—one that demands sustained scrutiny even without alarmism.
