Introduction

Spring 2025 brought a significant breakthrough in European security strategy. President Emmanuel Macron presented an ambitious plan to transform France’s nuclear deterrence forces into a collective defense system for all of Europe. This proposal, although consulted with allies for several years, gained new significance in the context of increasing threats from Russia and uncertainty about American commitment to defending the continent.

Origins of the Project

The history of this project reaches deep into the analysis of transatlantic defense structures. For over seventy years after World War II, the American „nuclear umbrella” served as the cornerstone of Western European security. France, which never fully trusted American guarantees, withdrew from NATO’s military structures and as early as the 1960s built an independent nuclear capability – the so-called Force de frappe.

However, only in recent years has there been a shift in European thinking. The lowering of the threshold for using nuclear weapons announced by President Putin in November 2024 prompted President Macron to express the possibility of extending French nuclear deterrence to the rest of Europe. Simultaneously, doubts about President Donald Trump’s willingness to defend NATO allies prompted European states to seek a credible alternative.

Architecture of the „Advanced Deterrence” Program

Macron announced an evolution of French nuclear doctrine toward what he termed „advanced nuclear deterrence” with a European dimension. The program will be implemented gradually, without threatening French decision-making autonomy.

Key assumptions of the project:

Preservation of Decision-Making Autonomy: Advanced deterrence will take place „without any sharing of the final decision to use nuclear weapons,” which will remain entirely in the hands of the President of the Republic. This important caveat means that France will be the sole decision-maker regarding the use of nuclear potential – there will be no collective sharing of responsibility.

Joint Exercises: This will be a gradual process, beginning with offering allies the opportunity to participate in joint deterrence exercises. Significantly, in summer 2025, France and the United Kingdom agreed that their deterrence, while remaining independent, could be coordinated bilaterally.

Potential Force Deployment: The plan may include the deployment of elements of French strategic air forces on the territory of allies to „complicate the calculations of our adversaries.”

Poland in European Security Architecture

Poland occupies a special place in Macron’s plans. Eight European states have agreed to participate in „advanced deterrence,” namely: Germany, the United Kingdom, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Sweden, and Denmark.

Poland is holding discussions with France and a group of its closest European allies regarding advanced nuclear deterrence programming, and Prime Minister Donald Tusk wrote on X: „We are arming ourselves with friends so that enemies do not dare attack us.”

The importance of Poland in this context is difficult to overstate. As a state located in the immediate vicinity of Russia, potential French guarantees could strengthen Polish sense of security. However, as experts emphasize, the program does not replace the existing NATO and US engagement on the eastern flank.

Military Potential of French Deterrence Forces

To understand the credibility of Macron’s proposal, it is worth analyzing the actual potential of the French nuclear arsenal. The French possess four submarines equipped with ballistic missiles powered by atomic energy (Triomphant-class), which can carry a total of 64 intercontinental missiles M51 with 4 to 6 warheads each.

The air-based component of the defense system is equally important. The ASMP-A missile has a range of 500 km, reaches three times the speed of sound, and carries a thermonuclear TNO warhead with a capacity of 300 kilotons. These elements have proven themselves in exercises – for the first time in history, British representatives participated in exercises of French air forces.

Developing its potential, France intends to increase the number of thermonuclear warheads from the current 288, while French authorities will simultaneously refrain from declaring the size of their nuclear arsenal. This will be the first increase in the number of warheads in the French arsenal since 1992.

Relationship with the United States

The French initiative is not aimed at the United States nor is it intended to replace NATO. Rather, it represents a pragmatic response to a changing geopolitical situation. President Emmanuel Macron’s proposal reduces the number of domains through which the Trump administration could blackmail its allies.

However, it also raises questions. The German nuclear deterrence problem remains unresolved, as „neither Germany’s participation in French nuclear maneuvers nor even the deployment of French strategic aircraft to Germany would be perceived in Moscow as a signal to be taken seriously.”

Prospects and Challenges

The French proposal represents a significant step toward the Europeanization of security, but its implementation faces numerous obstacles. Skepticism is expressed by German commentators, noting that „Macron’s offer is relevant only until French elections in spring of next year.” A change in French government could change the priority of these initiatives.

Nevertheless, there is broad consensus that Europe must strengthen its own defense capacity. For Poland, key importance will be demonstrating allied solidarity while maintaining traditional ties with the West.

Conclusion

The French proposal for „advanced nuclear deterrence” is a geopolitical strategy aimed at strengthening European security in the face of growing threats. Poland finds itself in an elite group of countries directly interested in this initiative, which testifies to the growing importance of the Central and Eastern Europe region in European strategic calculations.

While this model does not replace NATO guarantees and US commitment, it represents a real alternative in the event of changes in Washington’s approach to European defense. The real impact of the project will depend on the consistency of implementation, the allies’ ability to work together, and – above all – on whether Moscow will treat French nuclear potential with appropriate seriousness.