Kay Gottschalk, a member of the German Bundestag from the far-right AfD (Alternative for Germany), sparked outrage in Poland after he suggested that Poland should pay Germany €1.3 trillion in “reparations” for alleged “complicity” in the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines. Gottschalk added that pursuing such claims against Poland would be his “first decision as finance minister” and capped the message with a taunting line along the lines of “he who laughs last laughs best.” The statement drew attention not because it opens any realistic legal avenue at this stage, but because it deliberately combines several highly charged themes: Nord Stream, Russia’s war against Ukraine, long-running Polish–German disputes over responsibility and compensation, and domestic political polarisation on both sides.

Gottschalk’s line about a “first decision as finance minister” reads primarily as political provocation rather than a credible policy announcement. AfD is not in government, and the claim is framed in a way designed for social-media virality and domestic mobilisation. The choice of the figure—€1.3 trillion—is also not accidental. In the Polish public debate, “1.3 trillion” has circulated for years as a symbolic number associated with wartime losses and claims directed at Germany, especially amplified during the PiS era. In other words, the sum is less a calculation of damages linked to Nord Stream and more an intentionally loaded symbol meant to trigger immediate associations in Poland with the reparations dispute.

What do we know about Nord Stream itself and where does Poland enter the story? Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 were damaged on 26 September 2022 by underwater explosions in the Baltic Sea, widely treated from the outset as an act of sabotage. Investigations have involved multiple jurisdictions and remain complex, with public reporting pointing to suspects connected to Ukraine and to operational details such as a yacht rented in Rostock and activity in the area near the Danish island of Bornholm. The “Polish” angle has been fuelled mainly by procedural developments: one suspect described in media reports as a Ukrainian citizen was detained in Poland on the basis of a European Arrest Warrant, and a Polish court later refused to extradite him to Germany, ordering his release (reported in October 2025). This is the point AfD seizes on rhetorically, but a refusal to extradite in an individual case is a judicial decision within a specific legal framework—it is not an admission of state responsibility by Poland, and it does not automatically imply Polish “complicity” in the sabotage.

That is why the word “reparations” in Gottschalk’s post functions as a political slogan rather than a precise legal concept. If anyone were to pursue compensation over Nord Stream in a serious way, the routes would look entirely different and would depend on establishing facts and responsibility—criminal accountability of perpetrators, potential civil claims, and possibly state-to-state disputes—none of which currently include any public finding that Poland played a causative role. At present, based on publicly known information, there is no authoritative determination that would justify presenting Warsaw with a bill for the explosions, making the claim chiefly an element of political messaging.

In Poland, the post prompted sharp reactions. Government spokesperson Adam Szłapka framed it as a political provocation and used it to criticise segments of the Polish right seen as sympathetic to AfD, while other politicians also condemned the statement as scandalous and pointed to its domestic political motives. The timing and tone fit AfD’s broader approach in German politics, where the party remains one of the country’s strongest forces and thrives on confrontational, identity-laden narratives—especially those that travel well across borders and activate existing historical and geopolitical sensitivities.

The controversy also lands in a context in which AfD’s position in German public life is itself highly contentious, including debates over the party’s stance on Russia and scrutiny from German authorities. In such an environment, provocative claims aimed at Poland—particularly ones wrapped in the emotionally loaded language of “reparations”—serve as a tool of mobilisation and attention capture, even if they bear little resemblance to a realistic legal or diplomatic pathway.