This year’s World Economic Forum in Davos (19–23 January 2026) is taking place under the theme “A Spirit of Dialogue” and, according to organisers and media reporting, brings together an exceptionally strong political and business line-up. In practice, however, the tone of “dialogue” is shaped by hard geopolitics: Russia’s war against Ukraine, transatlantic tensions, and renewed disputes over trade and industrial policy. For the countries of our region—Central Europe and, more broadly, the EU/NATO eastern flank and the Three Seas space—Davos tends to frame the conversation around three main narratives, and these narratives largely determine both what is being said about the region and who is heard.

First, the region is increasingly portrayed as Europe’s security front line: support for Ukraine, deterrence of Russia, resilience of critical infrastructure, and the capacity of the defence-industrial base. A recurring message is that Europe is operating in an era of great-power politics in which medium and smaller states must build security not only through values and alliances, but also through concrete capabilities—industrial output, infrastructure, logistics, and political cohesion. In this lens, Central Europe is no longer treated as a “periphery” but as a strategic belt where the interests of NATO, the EU, the United States, and Russia intersect. Ukraine remains present not only as a political subject but also as an economic agenda: security guarantees, financing, and the reconstruction effort, with Davos side events and institutions signalling ongoing work on investment frameworks and infrastructure funds connected to Ukraine’s recovery.

Second, the Three Seas Initiative functions as a recognisable “brand” for Central Europe in Davos: infrastructure, energy security, and north–south connectivity in transport and digital networks. The region speaks most effectively in the language of investable projects—corridors, interconnectors, terminals, transmission networks, and data infrastructure—and Three Seas provides an understandable frame for investors and decision-makers. In this context, Central Europe is presented less as a collection of individual markets and more as a platform for coordinated upgrades in logistics, energy diversification, and connectivity, with a strong emphasis on the transatlantic dimension as a strategic anchor.

Third, Central Europe is also discussed through the prism of broader Western political tensions and the emergence of alternative cooperation formats. Davos amplifies signals of divergence inside the EU and across the transatlantic relationship: when some capitals emphasise alignment with EU and NATO consensus while others pursue separate initiatives, those differences quickly become a topic in high-level conversations. As a result, countries from the region can gain visibility not only through economic agendas but also through political positioning—sometimes in ways that overshadow the investment narrative.

In terms of representation, Poland has been particularly visible through the Three Seas thread and a set of high-level meetings and economic conversations, projecting the region’s infrastructure and security priorities as part of a broader strategic story. Romania has underscored a strong governmental presence with a clear focus on investment, European funds, and energy, aiming to position itself in evolving supply chains and energy transformation. Czechia has leaned into economic diplomacy, using Davos primarily for bilateral meetings and outreach to political and business leaders to promote exports, investment, and tourism. Bulgaria has combined standard government-level participation with heightened attention around its political signalling in broader international initiatives. Hungary, in the international reporting available from Davos, has tended to appear more through politically charged themes than through a distinct sectoral economic programme, illustrating a broader Davos dynamic: when a country arrives without a crisp, investable agenda in areas like energy, industry, infrastructure, or digitalisation, it is more likely to be noticed through politics rather than through business opportunities.

Overall, Davos 2026 “positions” Central Europe as important primarily as a function of two issues: security and infrastructure. The countries that come with a concrete offer—project pipelines, sectoral priorities, and credible ministerial portfolios—are the ones most clearly heard, while political differences within the region become instantly legible on the Davos stage because the forum is especially sensitive to signals about EU and NATO unity, resilience, and strategic direction.