Hungary and Slovakia announced on Wednesday, 18 February 2026, that they are suspending exports of diesel fuel to Ukraine. According to Budapest and Bratislava, the move is a response to the interruption of Russian crude oil transit through the Druzhba pipeline via Ukrainian territory—flows on which both countries still depend to a significant degree.
The immediate backdrop is a disruption that has persisted since 27 January 2026, when crude deliveries via Druzhba toward Central Europe were halted. The Ukrainian side has indicated that the issue is linked to the effects of a Russian attack that damaged parts of the relevant infrastructure. Hungarian and Slovak officials, however, argue that Kyiv is responsible for the prolonged stoppage, framing it as a political decision or an act of pressure.
In practical terms, this means diesel produced in the region— including output associated with refineries connected to the MOL/Slovnaft supply chain—will not be directed to Ukraine, at least until crude transit to Hungary and Slovakia is restored. Both governments present the decision as an emergency measure aimed at protecting domestic supply.
Budapest has explicitly tied the diesel suspension to its own fuel-security concerns: if crude is not flowing, the argument goes, refined products should be retained at home to minimize exposure to shortages and price spikes. Hungarian officials have also suggested that the country has substantial strategic reserves that can cushion short-term risks.
Slovakia has followed a similar line. Alongside the diesel halt, the discussion in Bratislava has included shifting supply priorities toward the domestic market and leaning on strategic stocks while seeking alternative ways to secure crude for refining.
The dispute exposes a broader structural problem. Despite EU sanctions on Russian oil—especially by sea—Hungary and Slovakia have continued to rely on exemptions linked to geography and pipeline infrastructure. As a result, their dependence on Druzhba means that any extended disruption quickly turns into a political confrontation and a market shock.
In recent days, both capitals have also looked for ways around the bottleneck, including options involving Croatia’s infrastructure (the Adria/JANAF route). Yet such solutions are politically sensitive, and they remain constrained by the wider sanctions environment and by regional disagreements over how far accommodation of “Russian-origin” supply can go.
For Ukraine, the decision comes at a difficult moment. In wartime conditions—especially during winter—fuel is critical for logistics, transport, and parts of the economy. If the halt lasts, it could tighten supply and increase costs, particularly while Russia continues to strike energy-related infrastructure. At the same time, Ukraine is not without alternatives: it imports fuel and energy through multiple channels, and markets typically attempt to reroute supplies when the logistics and pricing allow.
The European Commission has signaled that, in the near term, Hungary’s and Slovakia’s supply security should not be critically threatened, citing reserve requirements and the possibility of emergency measures. What happens next will likely follow one of three paths: a quick technical fix and resumption of Druzhba flows (allowing the diesel suspension to be reversed), a prolonged disruption that turns diesel into a tool of political leverage and further strains relations between Kyiv, Budapest, and Bratislava, or an acceleration of regional diversification through limited emergency volumes and alternative routes.
For the EU as a whole, the episode is another stress test of both sanctions policy and infrastructure resilience. The longer parts of the bloc remain tied to a single, vulnerable supply route, the easier it becomes for technical incidents—especially in wartime—to spill over into political disputes with cross-border economic consequences.
