Hungary took a decisive step toward reducing its long-standing dependence on Russian energy by signing its largest-ever liquefied natural gas (LNG) contract with the French company Engie and announcing negotiations with the United States over nuclear fuel supplies. These moves mark a significant policy shift for Budapest, which for years had been one of Moscow’s most reliable energy partners in the European Union. They also reflect a growing recognition within the Hungarian government that diversification of energy sources is no longer merely an EU-imposed objective but a national strategic necessity.
The ten-year LNG deal signed with Engie secures the delivery of about 400 million cubic meters of gas annually from 2028 to 2038, accounting for roughly 5% of Hungary’s total consumption. Earlier this year, Hungary’s state energy company MVM CEEnergy concluded a separate agreement with Shell for 200 million cubic meters per year starting in 2026. Together, these contracts lay the foundation for a gradual rebalancing of Hungary’s energy portfolio, offering new flexibility and reducing the dominance of Russian pipeline gas supplied through the TurkStream route. The LNG arrangements are designed not only to enhance supply security but also to give Budapest leverage in future pricing negotiations with Gazprom, which remains the primary supplier under a 15-year deal signed in 2021.
In parallel with the gas diversification strategy, Hungary is also seeking alternatives in the nuclear sector. Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó confirmed in late October that Hungary has entered talks with the United States about the possible purchase of nuclear fuel, a move that would complement a 2024 contract with France’s Framatome to begin supplying the Paks nuclear plant from 2027. Since Paks provides nearly 45% of the country’s electricity, ensuring access to multiple fuel sources is a matter of national energy security. Should cooperation with U.S. suppliers—likely involving Westinghouse—materialize, it would end Russia’s near-monopoly over Hungary’s nuclear cycle and align Budapest with similar diversification efforts already under way in other EU states operating Russian-designed reactors.
These developments are consistent with new language introduced in Hungary’s updated energy strategy, which—unlike previous versions—explicitly identifies reliance on a dominant external supplier, currently Russia, as a risk to national security and to the country’s ability to fulfill its regional role in the distribution of oil products. Hungary’s refining system, centered on MOL Group’s Danube refinery near Budapest and the Slovnaft refinery in Bratislava, plays a crucial role in supplying fuels to neighboring markets, including Slovakia, Austria, and parts of the Balkans. For that reason, any supply disruption, whether through the Druzhba oil pipeline or the TurkStream gas corridor, would have ripple effects far beyond Hungary’s borders.
While Budapest continues to defend certain exemptions from EU sanctions and maintains political ties with Moscow, the direction of its energy policy is unmistakably shifting. The combination of the Engie and Shell LNG deals and the pursuit of alternative nuclear fuel supplies signals a pragmatic attempt to hedge against future Russian volatility. Yet, despite the rhetoric of diversification, Hungary remains structurally tied to Russian energy for the foreseeable future. Gazprom still delivers about 4.5 billion cubic meters of gas annually, and MOL continues to rely on the Druzhba pipeline for a significant portion of its crude oil, although alternative supplies via Croatia’s Adria pipeline have become increasingly important.
The transition away from Russian energy dominance will therefore be gradual, constrained by existing contracts, infrastructure, and cost considerations. Adapting refinery configurations, securing port capacity for LNG, and investing in interconnectors all take time and money. Nonetheless, October 2025 may be remembered as a turning point: the moment when Hungary, long viewed as Moscow’s most energy-dependent ally within the EU, began to realign its strategy toward a more balanced, multi-source model. This evolution serves both Hungary’s national interests and the broader goal of strengthening Central Europe’s energy resilience.
For Russia, the implications are clear. Each non-Russian molecule of gas or pellet of nuclear fuel contracted by Hungary diminishes Moscow’s influence in Central Europe. While Hungary’s pivot is cautious and couched in pragmatic language, the cumulative effect of these new deals is unmistakably disadvantageous to the Kremlin. In energy terms, Hungary has not yet broken with Russia—but it has taken the first substantive steps down that path.
