Vytautas Sinica is a PhD of Political Theory in Vilnius University

The European Union is at a crossroads. The EU, as it has been organised so far by the Lisbon Treaty, is a union of states, even though it constantly tries to overstep its mandate. EU members that understand the importance of sovereignty, such as Denmark or Poland, can and do behave as sovereigns. This is a struggle, but it is possible. That can change.

The European Parliament recently approved by a narrow margin amendments to the EU Treaties that would abolish the Member States’ veto in the EU Council and increase the powers of supranational institutions. Such a reform is a decades-old federalist dream. It is no coincidence that Guy Verhofstadt, one of the fiercest federalists, is pushing for it. The idea has a long history. At the beginning of the century, the EU proposed a constitution that was rejected by the old EU members. Later, in 2010, Herman van Rompuy openly said that „nation states are dead” and that national borders were obsolete. All heard. Throughout the last decade, the sentiment of federalisation has been fading in European societies, while it has been expanding among „elites”.

The current proposals are the most concrete form of this yet. They are far from accepted. A vote in the Council is looming ahead. However, there is considerable support. Even greater than the support is the threat this reform poses to freedom and democracy in Europe.

First problem is one of principle. The abolition of the veto in the European Council would essentially make each Member State cease to be a state and become an administrative unit. Even today, sceptics already call countries like that, but it is still more of a metaphor. Abolishing the veto would make it a plain fact of political science. If a state cannot reject a decision to which it is bound by the will of its citizens (public opinion, a parliamentary decision, a referendum – a form does not matter so much), if the decision can be imposed on it by other countries, it is no longer a state. The EU is not the result of a mystical single European society (the European demos), but of the will of the European Member States. Member States sign the treaties, Member States are represented in the EU institutions. Each country must be able to decide whether to take major decisions. The EU can dictate whether we can remove Coca-Cola caps, whether we can use plastic straws, or how long cucumbers must be grown (although this is all extremely stupid). But it cannot decide on our constitutional principles.

Never mind that such states themselves would have agreed to surrender this or that part of their sovereignty. Freedom does not include the freedom to submit to slavery – once one has done that, one is no longer free. Accordingly, a state cannot surrender so much sovereignty that it no longer determines not only fundamental political decisions, but also – and most importantly – the further development of the EU and how their own sovereignty diminishes.

Jewish political theorist Yoram Hazony wrote on EU some harsh, but true words (Hazony, Virtue of Nationalism, 2018, p. 151-152):
Since the decision as to which objectives can be better achieved by the federal European government is in the hands of the officials of this government itself, there is no barrier to the constant reduction of the authority of the member national states other than the self-restraint of these same officials. This restraint has not, however, been forthcoming, and the EU bureaucracy, backed by federal European courts, has consistently extended its powers over member nations in areas such as economic policy, labor and employment policy, public health, communications, education, transportation, the environment, and urban planning. The European principle of subsidiarity is thus nothing other than a euphemism for empire: The subsidiary nations of Europe are only independent insofar as the European government decides that they will be independent.

By the way, the book was published this year both in Poland and Lithuania. These lines are about the current situation. But today, we see the operation of such a mechanism as an abuse of power by the EU. With the proposed amendments, this would be the new norm. No one could complain.

The other problem is more geopolitical. Everyone knows, even students are taught, that Germany and France see the EU as a projection of their power. Their leading position in the EU allows them to make their positions heard in the voice of the whole EU. It is no coincidence that both countries are in favour of federalisation – the more deeply integrated the EU is, the more influence they have within the EU and, through it, in the world. The amendments adopted by the European Parliament make it very clear that the relative influence of the smaller countries would drastically decrease, while the relative power of the largest countries would increase.

Since this cannot be denied, the usual response to this comment will be not to think of power as a zero-sum game. „Greater unity will benefit all”. The truth is that Giandomenico Majone, twenty years ago, was very precise in his formulation that European integration is a zero-sum game between efficiency and democracy. The deeper the integration, the more efficiency and the less democracy. Integration is a zero-sum game – sovereignty and democracy are sacrificed for more efficient solutions. But what we consider efficient in different countries also differs.
After the elections in Poland, there was a joke on the internet. One man asked why there was no more German minority in the Polish Parliament. „Because now there will be a German majority”, replied another. It was a good joke. Everyone can have different opinions on Donald Tusk’s policies, but they are clearly more favourable to Berlin than Kaczynski’s were. The Poles as a nation are well aware of who is pulling the reins of EU politics and are very wary of German influences.
„Nothing will safeguard the freedom of nations, their culture, their social, economic, political and military security better than nation states,” Morawiecki said, adding that „other systems are illusory or utopia,” warning of a further federalisation of the EU.
„If the individual nations of the European Union seek to dominate others, Europe may fall prey to the same mistakes of the past,” Morawiecki warned in Heidelberg, saying that his „pro-Europeanism” would be expressed by his support for EU enlargement, not further centralisation.
After all, if we understand (and we do) that a federal EU would be an EU of decisions dictated by Germany and France, what content do we expect from it? What does German and French influence mean in practice?
In domestic politics, it means more and more Leftist ideology, woke thinking, aggressive culture wars. Today, it is basically only the veto and similar brakes that are stopping us from declaring the homosexual family, abortion, gender reassignment, immigration to the country of choice, multilingualism and decisions alike to be human rights that must be guaranteed at EU level. Particularly on border protection issues, the dominance of the German approach would be disastrous for both Southern and Central European countries. It is even disastrous for Finland, which is also suffering from Russian hybrid attacks and has closed its border to surpirising African migrants even beyond the Arctic Circle (you heard correct). Berlin and Paris do not understand and do not send any signals that they will understand that the EU’s external borders must be protected, that mass immigration is a threat and that, once immigrants are admitted, they require strict integration, which is not always possible, but more usually not wanted.
In foreign policy, domination by Germany and France means being pragmatic with Russia and cautious with the US. Many in Western Europe would love that. In Central Europe, it sounds like a recipe for disaster. In defence, it would mean indifference on strenghtening military capabilities or focus on missions on other continents. It is commonplace in Europe today to consider Trump as a friend of Putin, who would betray Europe if he was elected. It is quickly forgotten how, in 2018, Trump scolded Germany for not providing defence funding, for its abandoned army and for the pipelines that fund the Russian war machine. Germans literally laughted in the hall of United Nations and said that they contribute to defence through humanitarian aid. Troubling thing to hear anywhere East of Germany.
This Franco-German attitude is not just a problem for Central Europe. Central European countries like Lithuania and Poland have been saying since Putin came to power that Russia is a threat, that it is imperial and revanchist, that it cannot be a reliable partner, and that energy projects for Russia are just levers of influence. Nobody believed it. When the war in Ukraine broke out, a number of Western countries’ and EU officials publicly admitted that they had been wrong not to hear the warnings from Lithuania and Poland. Not Merkel, of course.
From what has been said, it may be clear why the issue of deeper integration is particularly ironic in a security context. In countries like Lithuania, where support for the EU is high and aid to Ukraine is a priority, the abolition of the veto is perceived precisely as a means of strengthening security. It will then be possible to „break down” obstacles to support for Ukraine. Obstacles such as Hungary. Good, patriotic, nation-state-loving people are ready to support the change of EU treaties and the surrender of sovereignty for the sake of… bending Hungary. The road to hell is paved with good wishes. A federation within the EU would be incomparably more favourable to Russia. For the post-Soviet countries that regard Russia not as a temporary but as a permanent threat, this would mean a loss of power, a rape in culture wars and a quicker return to so-called normal pragmatic relations with Russia. It is no coincidence that even Politico has argued that deeper EU integration is in Russia’s interests and contrary to those of the US.
Orban’s Hungary and its stance on Ukraine are just a pretext and a smokescreen that allows countries like Germany and France to kill few birds with one stone. Firstly, it allows them to hide their own pro-Kremlin stance, their avoidance of conflict escalation, their fear of damaging relations with Putin to the point where they cannot normalise them. Fingers are being pointed at Orban, but no obvious steps are being taken to bypass him on an opt-in basis, with aid packages being accepted by all the countries that want them. After all, if there really is a will, it would be almost all EU members participating. But maybe there is no will and it is more convenient to berate Orban for supposedly being the one who is standing in the way of defeating Russia.

Secondly, by waving Orban around, the federalists are successfully selling the idea of a federation to the countries that are or should be the least interested in it. The culturally conservative, Leftist-rejecting, Russia-fearing, relatively small Central European countries. It takes some great marketing skills to sell something that the buyer does not need and even harms. The Federalists are demonstrating it.

There is no reason to expect Lithuania to be among the countries vetoing these changes. Lithuania is not vetoing anything. Lithuania was the first in the EU to ratify the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, without having read it or even translated it to Lithuanian. There are, however, a few countries in the post-Soviet space that could veto. This issue will also be a serious test for Meloni. Whoever cries „veto” and puts the brakes on this reform, the EU as a whole will have to thank them. Although it will take a while for many of us to come to our senses.

Vytautas Sinica (1990) is a political scientist, publisher and politician of Lithuania. He has co-founded the National Alliance political party and is now a member of council of Vilnius, capital of Lithuania. In 2022, he defended his dissertation on political philosophy „Theoretical Foundations of European Unification” at the Faculty of Philosophy of Vilnius University. In 2019 he published a book „Do We Still Need a State of Lithuania?”