In Moldova, the debate over a possible unification with Romania has flared up again—this time not because of fringe voices, but after remarks by the country’s two most senior leaders. President Maia Sandu said she would vote in favour of a union with Romania in a hypothetical referendum, and in mid-January Prime Minister Alexandru Munteanu made a similar declaration. Both were careful to stress that these are strictly personal views, while the government’s concrete priority remains integration with the European Union.
That caution is not accidental. Polling suggests that support for “unification” is still a minority position within Moldovan society. Surveys cited in international reporting put support at roughly around one third, while other recent polling has shown a clear majority opposed. Against that backdrop, any attempt to turn the idea into an immediate political project would risk deepening internal divisions at a time when Chişinău is trying to keep its EU agenda on track.
In his interview, Prime Minister Munteanu underlined that he was speaking only for himself, not for the entire cabinet. At the same time, he emphasised that, for now, Moldova’s most important objective is EU accession. In practice, this amounts to trying to balance two narratives at once: signalling cultural and historical closeness to Romania, while keeping formal unification off the near-term agenda so the issue does not trigger a domestic political clash that could weaken the European course.
President Sandu’s framing follows a similar pattern. In a recent appearance on a British political podcast, she said that if a referendum were held she would vote “yes,” pointing to Russia’s growing pressure and the difficulty for a small state of sustaining a stable democracy under persistent external strain. Yet she also noted that a majority of Moldovan citizens do not currently support such a step, which is why she described EU integration as the more realistic and broadly unifying national goal—one that, in her view, strengthens Moldova’s sovereignty rather than diluting it.
The gap between elite rhetoric and public sentiment has several layers. First, there is the question of identity and historical memory. The territory of today’s Moldova—Bessarabia—belonged to Romania in the interwar period, was incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1940, and Moldova declared independence in 1991. For some citizens, a union with Romania is therefore seen as a “return” to a historical community, while for others it raises fears of losing distinct statehood or reigniting an identity conflict.
Second, Moldova is internally diverse—linguistically, culturally and politically. Alongside a Romanian-speaking majority, there is a sizeable Russian-speaking minority, and the country’s geopolitical orientation has repeatedly divided society. In such circumstances, the unification theme—however cautiously presented as a private opinion—can easily be weaponised by political actors to polarise and mobilise competing camps.
Third, there is a pragmatic dimension. For many Moldovans, a pathway toward the European Union without changing state borders is more attractive than a dramatic constitutional transformation. In several polls, support for EU accession has tended to be higher than support for immediate unification with Romania, suggesting that “European integration” functions as a broader, less divisive umbrella than the question of state merger.
There is also an important background factor: Romania is already present in Moldova through dense social and institutional ties regardless of any formal union. A large number of Moldovans hold Romanian citizenship, which grants access to EU mobility, education and labour markets. This “soft integration” can reduce pressure for a single, spectacular political act, because many of the practical benefits associated with Romania’s EU membership are already available to a significant share of Moldovan citizens.
The geopolitical context matters too. Sandu and Munteanu are speaking at a time of heightened security concerns in the region. The Moldovan leadership has repeatedly accused Russia of interference and destabilisation efforts, while the broader European debate has increasingly focused on hybrid threats, disinformation, and the vulnerability of small states. In this environment, unification with Romania is sometimes presented by its proponents as a security “backstop,” yet it can just as easily become a trigger for internal turbulence if pursued without a clear and broad social mandate.
So is a “merger” a realistic scenario? For now, the most plausible reading is that these statements are primarily political signals rather than announcements of an imminent course change. Analysts note that such remarks are not new and do not necessarily indicate a shift in policy in either Chişinău or Bucharest in the foreseeable future. The data from opinion polls and the careful language used by Moldova’s leaders point to a more likely trajectory of “integration through the EU” rather than formal unification of the two states.
