The change of power in Budapest does not automatically mean a radical shift in Hungary’s approach to Russia and Ukraine. Although Viktor Orbán’s defeat has been interpreted across Europe as the end of an era of political ambiguity toward the Kremlin, public sentiment along the Danube remains far more complicated. More and more Hungarians want their country to return to the European mainstream, but that does not necessarily mean widespread enthusiasm for a hard anti-Russian line or full support for Ukraine.
For years, Orbán cultivated the image of a leader capable of maintaining close ties with Moscow while remaining in the European Union and NATO. That strategy, however, gradually became a burden on his political camp. Péter Magyar’s victory shows that a large part of society has grown tired of Hungary’s isolation from the West and its confrontational course toward Brussels.
Yet this pro-European turn does not automatically translate into a clearly anti-Russian attitude. Hungarians, including those disappointed with Orbán, often view relations with Russia through the lens of national interest, above all energy security and fuel prices. In practice, this means that even the new ruling camp speaks of the need to preserve economic contacts with Moscow in the short term, as Hungary remains heavily dependent on Russian resources and related energy projects.
Péter Magyar is therefore trying to combine two different logics: a political return to Europe and pragmatism toward Russia. On the one hand, he declares a course more closely aligned with the EU and NATO, speaks of rebuilding relations with Brussels, and avoids repeating Orbán’s rhetoric that excused or downplayed the Kremlin’s actions. On the other hand, he signals readiness to talk to Vladimir Putin, maintain channels of communication, and take a realistic approach to energy issues. Even some European commentators point out that after the change of power, Budapest will not become unconditionally pro-Ukrainian overnight.
This is precisely the most important feature of Hungary’s public debate today: not so much sympathy for Russia as reluctance toward a policy based solely on moral gestures if it were to come at the expense of national interests. For many voters, Russia remains a historical and civilizational threat, but also a state with which, in their view, one must know how to deal pragmatically. In practice, this means that even after Orbán’s departure, Hungary is unlikely to undergo a sudden transformation toward a sharply anti-Kremlin course, and will instead choose a model of cautious adjustment.
For Ukraine and for the European Union as a whole, this is both good news and an ambiguous signal. It is good news because it marks the end of a period in which Orbán permanently obstructed European initiatives, and Budapest may become a more predictable partner. It is ambiguous because the new leadership does not intend to pursue an emotional foreign policy and will carefully protect its own interests, especially where energy, the economy, and the social costs of war are concerned. Hungary is therefore returning to Europe, but not necessarily on the terms that the strongest opponents of Russia would prefer.
