The Alternative for Germany’s landslide victory in Sunday’s state election in Saxony-Anhalt is formally a regional event. Politically, however, its consequences may reach far beyond the borders of this eastern German state — particularly into Central Europe.

According to the preliminary result, the AfD received 43.8 per cent of the vote, more than doubling its 2021 support. Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s Christian Democratic Union fell to just 17.2 per cent. The AfD secured 39 of the state parliament’s 83 seats, three short of an absolute majority. Voter turnout reached 76.9 per cent, its highest level in the state since German reunification. ZDF

The party may still be unable to form a government. Germany’s mainstream parties have maintained a political “firewall” excluding cooperation with the AfD, while the AfD’s regional branch in Saxony-Anhalt has been classified as right-wing extremist by the state’s domestic intelligence service. Nevertheless, the scale of the victory means that the AfD can no longer be treated simply as a protest party operating on the margins of German politics.

A weaker German political centre

The most immediate consequence for Central Europe may be the weakening of Chancellor Merz and Germany’s traditional political establishment. His CDU had governed Saxony-Anhalt since 2002, and its electoral collapse will intensify the debate over whether the party should continue excluding the AfD or move further to the right in an attempt to win back voters.

A weakened federal government in Berlin would be a serious matter for Poland, Czechia, Slovakia and Hungary. Germany remains the region’s main economic partner and one of the central political powers within the European Union. Czechia sends approximately 32 per cent of its exports to Germany, while the corresponding figures are about 27 per cent for Poland and 25 per cent for both Hungary and Luxembourg. German Federal Statistical Office

Political paralysis in Berlin could therefore delay decisions concerning EU budgets, defence investment, industrial policy, energy infrastructure and support for European manufacturing. Central European economies, particularly their automotive and industrial sectors, are closely integrated with German production chains.

The danger is not necessarily that an AfD-led federal government is imminent. The more immediate risk is that increasingly fragmented German parliaments will produce unstable coalitions whose main purpose is keeping the AfD out of power. Such governments may find it difficult to implement long-term economic reforms or maintain consistent European policies.

Growing uncertainty over Ukraine and Russia

The election also has major security implications. The AfD opposes German military assistance to Ukraine, favours restoring relations with Moscow and has criticised sanctions against Russia. Ulrich Siegmund, the party’s leading candidate in Saxony-Anhalt, has argued that rebuilding ties with Russia could help reduce energy prices.

A regional government cannot independently change German foreign policy or withdraw the country from international sanctions. However, a succession of AfD victories could gradually alter the national debate. Other parties may come under increasing electoral pressure to reduce aid to Kyiv, question sanctions or prioritise negotiations with Moscow.

This would be particularly troubling for Poland and the Baltic states, which regard Russia as a direct security threat and see continued German involvement in NATO’s eastern flank as essential. It could also deepen the existing division within Central Europe.

Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and parts of the Slovak political establishment may welcome the rise of a German party advocating dialogue with Russia and opposing further military support for Ukraine. By contrast, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are likely to view the result as a warning that Germany’s commitment to the region’s security may become less predictable.

Warsaw’s reaction demonstrates this concern. Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski described the election result as a “very, very worrying signal”, while Prime Minister Donald Tusk sharply criticised Polish politicians celebrating the AfD’s success. Euronews

Encouragement for Central European populists

The victory will also provide psychological and political encouragement to nationalist and populist parties across the region. The AfD has demonstrated that a party excluded by nearly the entire political establishment can nevertheless win almost half of the vote.

Its campaign combined opposition to immigration, criticism of political elites, cultural conservatism, economic dissatisfaction and distrust of federal institutions. Similar themes are already present in political debates in Poland, Czechia, Slovakia and Hungary.

The result may encourage Central European parties to adopt stronger anti-immigration messages, harsher criticism of Brussels and a more confrontational approach towards liberal institutions. It also strengthens the argument that excluding radical parties from government does not necessarily reduce their electoral appeal. On the contrary, the AfD has successfully presented the firewall as evidence that the established parties are unwilling to respect the preferences of a large part of the electorate.

However, cooperation between the AfD and Central European nationalist parties has clear limits. German nationalism creates particular unease in Poland, where some AfD politicians have made controversial statements about the country’s borders, Germany’s wartime history and Polish-German relations. The party’s strong opposition to supporting Ukraine also conflicts with the position of much of the Polish right.

For this reason, the AfD’s success may divide Central European conservatives rather than unite them. Some will see the party as an ally in the struggle against migration and EU centralisation. Others will regard it as a threat because of its attitude towards Russia and its revisionist rhetoric.

Pressure on European migration policy

Migration is another area in which the result could influence Germany’s neighbours. The AfD campaigned for stricter asylum rules, more deportations and a fundamental reversal of Germany’s migration policy.

Even without entering government, the party’s success is likely to push the CDU and other German parties towards tougher positions. This could lead to stronger German border controls and additional restrictions on the movement of asylum seekers.

For Poland and Czechia, tighter controls on their borders with Germany could produce practical and economic difficulties. Permanent checks would disrupt cross-border commuting, freight transport and local business. At the same time, governments in Warsaw, Prague, Bratislava and Budapest may use the German result to strengthen their opposition to the EU’s common migration arrangements.

A warning, but not yet a change of power

The result does not mean that the AfD is about to determine German foreign or European policy. It remains short of a majority in Saxony-Anhalt, and the other parties may still form a government without it. A state election cannot directly change Berlin’s decisions on NATO, Ukraine or the European Union.

Its symbolic importance is nevertheless enormous. The AfD has moved from being an opposition party with a strong eastern German base to a party capable of dominating an election and approaching an absolute parliamentary majority. It has also inflicted a humiliating defeat on the party of the federal chancellor.

For Central Europe, the most important question is therefore not who will govern Saxony-Anhalt. It is whether Sunday’s election represents an exceptional regional result or the beginning of a broader transformation of German politics.

If the AfD repeats its success in other states and eventually at federal level, Central Europe could face a Germany that is more nationalist, more sceptical of European integration, less committed to Ukraine and less predictable in its relations with Russia. Even if the party remains excluded from government, its growing strength will influence the policies of its competitors.

For countries whose economies and security are closely connected to Germany, that political shift can no longer be dismissed as an internal German affair.