The change of power in Budapest does not automatically mean a reset in Hungarian-Ukrainian relations. After the electoral victory of Péter Magyar’s party, many commentators in Europe assumed that the end of Viktor Orbán’s rule would remove one of the most serious obstacles in the European Union’s relations with Ukraine. The reality, however, is more complicated. Hungary may move away from the most pro-Russian rhetoric of the previous government, but its conflict of interests with Kyiv will remain.
The issue of the Druzhba pipeline has become a good symbol of these tensions. After Magyar’s victory, Ukraine resumed the transit of Russian oil through the southern branch of the pipeline to Hungary and Slovakia. Deliveries had previously been suspended in January following a Russian attack on a pumping station in Brody. At the same time, the European Union unlocked a €90 billion loan for Ukraine and another sanctions package against Russia — measures that Budapest had previously blocked. According to the Centre for Eastern Studies, the resumption of oil transit was the direct reason why Hungary withdrew its veto on financial assistance for Ukraine.
In Wirtualna Polska’s programme Bez Doktryny, Zbigniew Parafianowicz and Marek Magierowski pointed out that it is difficult to speak of a simple reconciliation in this situation. Parafianowicz noted that comments on the Hungarian side suggested that Volodymyr Zelensky had “spat in Magyar’s face in a Soviet-style manner,” implying that he had first benefited politically from Magyar’s victory and then set tough conditions for him. In this interpretation, Kyiv treated the change of power in Budapest not as the beginning of a partnership dialogue, but as an opportunity to obtain a concrete concession: the lifting of Hungary’s opposition to financial support for Ukraine.
The new Hungarian prime minister, however, is not a politician who can simply adopt the Ukrainian agenda. Magyar has announced the rebuilding of relations with the European Union and NATO, and his victory ended 16 years of Orbán’s rule. His party, TISZA, won 53 percent of the vote and a constitutional majority, giving it a mandate for a deep reconstruction of the state. In foreign policy, the party declares a turn toward the West. This does not mean, however, that Budapest will stop pursuing a policy based on national interest, especially where energy, the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia and Hungarian public opinion are concerned.
After the election, Magyar called on Ukraine to restore the operation of the Druzhba pipeline as soon as possible if the infrastructure was ready, and on Russia to resume deliveries in accordance with existing contracts. This shows that although his language toward Ukraine is less confrontational than Orbán’s, Budapest’s basic energy interests remain unchanged. Hungary is still dependent on Russian oil, and the issue of transit through Ukraine may return repeatedly as an instrument of pressure or as a subject of political bargaining.
The second source of tension remains the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia. Magyar has said that his government will seek to rebuild alliances with neighbouring countries, including Ukraine, but he also stressed that problems concerning national minorities must be resolved. He recalled that around 100,000 Hungarians still live in Ukraine and that disputes inherited from Orbán’s rule will not disappear overnight. This means that even a pro-European Budapest will demand guarantees from Kyiv for Hungarians living in Transcarpathia.
Marek Magierowski rightly observed that it would be a mistake to assume that most Hungarians think about Ukraine in the same way Poles do. From the beginning of the war, Hungarian public opinion was shaped by a completely different narrative than Polish public opinion. For years, Orbán’s propaganda presented Ukraine as a source of problems: a state dragging Europe into war, threatening the Hungarian economy and disregarding the rights of the Hungarian minority. Even after Orbán’s defeat, these attitudes will not vanish overnight.
Hungary’s relations with Kyiv are therefore likely to move from a phase of open obstruction to a phase of hard pragmatism. Magyar’s Hungary may be less pro-Russian, more predictable and more willing to talk to Brussels. But it will not automatically become Ukraine’s unconditional ally. The disputes over oil, EU money, minority rights and Ukraine’s membership in the European Union will continue to weigh on bilateral relations.
Orbán’s fall therefore changes the atmosphere, but it does not remove the structural problems. For Kyiv, this is good news, because a politician who for years consistently blocked parts of European assistance is leaving the scene. But for Budapest, a change of government does not mean abandoning its own expectations toward Ukraine. The conflict between Hungary and Ukraine is not fading away. Rather, it is entering a new stage: less ideological, but still full of tension.
